Privacy Architecture
Privacy is not a feature. It is the foundation.
Every technical decision in VideoVerify.Me is evaluated against one question: does this reduce or increase the risk of identity exposure for either party?
The five privacy pillars
No Peer-to-Peer Media Routing
All media routes through the platform's own TURN relay servers rather than directly between the two browsers. In standard WebRTC peer-to-peer mode, the two browsers exchange their IP addresses as part of the connection negotiation process. This is the well-known WebRTC IP leak problem. The fix is to force all media through a relay server that the platform controls. Neither the Host's nor the Guest's browser ever learns the other party's IP address.
Both parties connect to the TURN server, and the TURN server relays the media between them. The IP address that each party's browser sees in the connection is the TURN server's IP, not the other person's. This is a non-negotiable requirement. It is also a cost driver, since relaying media is more expensive than peer-to-peer, but it is the only architecture that genuinely protects both parties.
No Account Required for Guests
Guests must never be asked to create an account, provide an email address, or supply any personally identifying information. The session URL is their credential. This is both a privacy protection and a UX advantage: reducing friction for the Guest increases the likelihood they actually join the session.
No Persistent Media Storage
The platform does not record, log, or store any video, audio, or chat content from sessions. This is both a privacy commitment and a legal risk reduction strategy. If the platform does not store the content, it cannot be subpoenaed, breached, or misused. The session exists in memory for its duration and then it is gone.
The one exception is the Verified Snapshot feature, which requires retaining a brief recording for the duration of the Snapshot's validity period. This is explicitly opt-in, requires Host consent, and is clearly disclosed in the privacy policy.
Minimal Host Account Data
Host accounts require only an email address and a password. No real name, no phone number, no payment address beyond what a payment processor requires for Pro subscriptions. The platform does not know who the Host is in any meaningful sense beyond their email.
Screenshot and Screen Recording Deterrence
No browser-based solution can completely prevent a determined user from capturing what is on their screen, because a person can always point a second camera at their monitor. However, the platform implements meaningful deterrents.
The session page disables the browser's native screenshot shortcut handling where the API permits it. A visible, persistent watermark on the video feed includes the session ID and a timestamp, making any captured image traceable back to the specific session. A clear notice is displayed to both parties at the start of every session stating that screenshots and recordings are prohibited by the platform's terms of service.
The TURN relay requirement in plain language
When two browsers try to connect directly for a video call, they have to tell each other their IP addresses so they know where to send the video data. This is the WebRTC IP leak. The fix is to put a relay server in the middle.
Instead of Browser A sending video directly to Browser B, Browser A sends video to the relay, and the relay forwards it to Browser B. Neither browser ever learns the other's IP address. The relay is the only thing that sees both. Since the platform controls the relay, it can ensure that the IP addresses are never logged or exposed.
Host's Browser
IP: hidden from Guest
encrypted relay
VideoVerify.Me TURN Relay
Platform-controlled
encrypted relay
Guest's Browser
IP: hidden from Host
Geolocation scoring and privacy law
The Guest's IP address is visible to the platform's relay server as a natural consequence of the connection. This is no different from any web server seeing the IP address of a connecting client. The platform is not performing any tracking, fingerprinting, or cross-session correlation. It is performing a one-time, session-scoped lookup against public IP intelligence databases.
Legal review is required before the geolocation feature ships, particularly under GDPR in Europe and various US state privacy laws.